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Abstract
Studies on members of the crow family using the ‘‘Aesop’s Fable’’ paradigm have revealed remarkable abilities in these
birds, and suggested a mechanism by which associative learning and folk physics may interact when learning new
problems. In the present study, children between 4 and 10 years of age were tested on the same tasks as the birds. Overall
the performance of the children between 5–7-years was similar to that of the birds, while children from 8-years were able to
succeed in all tasks from the first trial. However the pattern of performance across tasks suggested that different learning
mechanisms might be being employed by children than by adult birds. Specifically, it is possible that in children, unlike
corvids, performance is not affected by counter-intuitive mechanism cues.
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Introduction
Recent studies with members of the crow family [1,2,3] have
investigated the cognition underlying one of Aesop’s most familiar
fables. In this tale, a thirsty crow comes across a half-filled jug of
water. Unable to reach the water to drink, the crow drops stones
into the pitcher until the level of the water raises enough for him to
drink. Bird and Emery [1] found that Rooks were not only capable
of this, but would choose the most efficient tool (large rather than
small stones) and preferentially drop stones into water rather than
sawdust. Subsequent studies with Eurasian Jays [2] sought to
investigate whether another species of corvid could also solve this
task and if so, what these birds understand.
After learning to drop stones into a tube to receive a reward, the
Jays were presented with a choice between a tube half-filled with
sawdust and a tube half-filled with water, both containing an out-
of-reach food item. Having had no experience of water in this
form, or discovering the consequences of dropping stones into
water, this choice could be used to assess the birds’ ability to learn
the necessary conditions for success. Two out of the four birds that
were tested learned to drop significantly more stones into the water
than into the sawdust over the course of 15 trials (the others were
uninterested in the task). These two birds also quickly learned to
drop significantly more sinking than x floating items into water.
Such learning, while impressive, cannot be said to differ in nature
to that characteristic of instrumental learning, namely that
performance of a particular action (in this case dropping a
sinkable item into water) leads to the increased probability of a
reward. For example, in the sawdust versus water task, dropping a
stone into water would lead to the food reward being reachable on
around a fifth of occasions, while dropping a stone into sawdust
would never result in the reward being accessible. Thus the birds
may simply have learned which tube was more likely to be
rewarded. Dropping a stone into water would also lead to the food
moving slightly closer, which may also be rewarding, while
dropping a stone into sawdust leads to no movement of the
reward.
To investigate whether the birds’ performance could be
explained by instrumental learning, Cheke and colleagues
conducted a series of control tests that showed that the birds
were able to learn in a mechanised version of the task in which
stone-dropping resulted in the approach of food. The jays were,
however, unable to learn when the reward probabilities remained
the same, but the reward did not move. This contrast was
interpreted to suggest that it was not the causal mechanism of
the Aesop’s Fable task that the birds were able to learn, but the
relationship between stone-insertions and movement. In a final
control, Cheke and colleagues presented the birds with a ‘‘U-tube’’
apparatus in which insertion of a stone into the correct tube
apparently caused the level of water in the adjacent tube to rise.
This apparatus consisted of a U-tube and a single tube, whose
bases were hidden beneath an opaque base. Because the U-tube
contained a single body of water, a stone inserted into one arm
would raise the level of water in both arms, while a stone inserted
into the single tube would raise the level of only that tube. The bait
was placed within one arm of the U-tube. This task was designed
to offer the same movement cues as the original task (i.e. stone
insertion into one tube caused the approach of food, stone
insertion into the other tube did not) but with confusing or
counterintuitive mechanism cues. Cheke and colleagues found that
the birds were unable to learn this task even when given twice as
many trials as on the original task. They thus suggested that while
instrumental learning involving movement cues was both neces-
sary and sufficient for learning in the Aesop’s fable task, the
presence of cues suggesting a ‘‘possible’’ or ‘‘impossible’’ causal
mechanism were able to enhance or retard learning respectively.
The Aesop’s Fable paradigm provides a valuable tool with
which to investigate the interaction between instrumental learning
(the ability to learn to perform an action if that action is rewarded),
causal reasoning (understanding that one event causes another) and
mechanistic inference (understanding why one event causes
another, i.e. the ability to explain the causal relationship between
two things in terms of the underlying mechanism). An advantage
of this particular paradigm is that the mechanism is natural (i.e.
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not man-made) and perceivable (in that it doesn’t involve invisible
forces such as electricity or magnetism), and the action (stone
dropping) is physically simple. This means that the ability to
understand the affordances of the task can be easily separated from
exposure to technology and fine motor capacity and thus makes it
appropriate for investigating physical cognition in both young
children and animals.
Much research on causal reasoning in children has employed
paradigms in which the to-be-inferred mechanism is explicitly
explained and primed [4] or is opaque [5,6,7,8,9]. As such it does
not allow investigation into the interaction between causal and
mechanistic reasoning. Such studies reveal that children of 3–
4 years are able to infer causation from co-variation and contiguity
(and many other factors such as temporal order and reasoning by
exclusion). Even infants are capable of forming expectations from
complex statistical regularities [10,11,12], although they are
unable to act upon them. However, these studies cannot assess
the extent to which children are making inferences about the
mechanism. Our aim is to investigate the interaction between
causal understanding based on instrumental learning (that is,
based on contingency and contiguity) and understanding of
mechanism in the learning of physical problems. Further, we wish
to explore whether cognitive systems as structurally divergent as
those of corvids and humans can be said to be functionally
convergent in terms of not only their performance on physical
cognition tasks, but also in the manner in which these tasks are
learned.
It has been argued that causal reasoning based on statistical and
perception-based analysis may develop separately to mechanism-
based analysis. These two systems interact to allow children to
flexibly adapt their causal models of the world by neither being led
too often down blind alleys by coincidental contingency, or being
prevented from identifying causation in situations involving
unfamiliar mechanisms [13]. Thus one might expect children to
pass through several stages of understanding as they develop; from
being unable to learn about the relationship between actions and
consequences, through having a concept of causality based on
perceptual and statistical regularities only, to having a concept of
mechanisms that can be adapted and finessed by perceived causal
relationships (for example, understanding that unsupported things
usually fall but being able to learn that this is not true if those things
have wings).
In the current experiment, children between the ages of 4- and
10-years were trained to drop stones into tubes in a similar manner
as the Eurasian Jays [2]. They were presented with three of the
same tasks as the birds: Water versus Sawdust [1,2,3], Sinking
versus Floating [2,3], and the U-tube [2]. In all tasks the children
were given five 2-minute trials in which to attempt to retrieve a
floating token that could be exchanged for a sticker. Finally, these
results were compared to performance on the classic Piagetian
conservation of volume task, which has been classically used to
differentiate between pre-operational and concrete operational
thought in children. The former is associated with ‘‘phenomen-
istic’’ reasoning (inferring causation from co-occurrence) while the
latter is associated with reasoning about seen or inferred
mechanisms. This transition is thought to occur around the age
of 7-years [14,15,16].
We hypothesised that the children would pass through several
stages of performance during development (see Table 1). Specif-
ically, we predicted that many 4-year-olds would be unable to
learn any of the tasks and would perform at chance (due to the
complex cause-effect relationships involved), whereas the slightly
older children (older 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds)
would be able to learn the association between dropping particular
items in particular locations and an approaching reward. This is
based on literature suggesting that children of this age can learn
and act on cause-effect relationships [5,6,7,8,9,12]. These children
will not, however, have a concept of the causal mechanism and
consequently they would perform equally well on all three tasks.
We predicted that older children (7-/8-/9-year-olds) would have
formed a (potentially simplified) concept of the mechanism
underlying displacement (as predicted by previous studies on
causal mechanism [13,16,17,18]). These children should have a
pre-formed idea about what is and is not possible given this
mechanism. Consequently, these children should perform com-
parably on the first two tasks, but perform badly on the U-tube
since this task presents an apparently impossible causal relation-
ship. Finally, the oldest children (10-years) may be able to flexibly
adapt their inferred mechanism and potentially infer the presence
of the U-tube so as to allow them to marry the perceptual
contingency with their understanding of mechanism. These
children were thus expected to perform with a very high success
rate on all three tasks. Finally, we conjectured that performance on
tasks 1 and 2 should be predicted by performance on the
conservation of volume task [14,15,16].
Methods
Subjects
Children aged 4–10 (N = 80: 4-year-olds: n = 20; 5-year-olds:
n = 16; 6-year-olds: n = 4; 7-year-olds: n = 14; 8-year-olds: n = 11;
9-year-olds: n = 8; 10-year-olds: n = 5) were recruited from a
Cambridgeshire Primary School. The sample consisted of 40 boys
and 42 girls. Two subjects (both boys: one 4-year-old and one 5-
year-old) were removed from the analysis because they were
unwilling to take part in the experiment.
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the University of Cambridge
Research Ethics Committee. Informed written consent was gained
from parents before any child took part.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a room in the school. Each
subject was presented with a series of tasks that were equivalent to
those used by Cheke and colleague’s recent experiments with
Eurasian Jays [2].
Training
The children were presented with the ‘‘platform’’ apparatus
originally used by Bird and Emery [19] and subsequently by
Cheke and colleagues [2] consisting of a Perspex box in which a
platform is held in place by a magnet. When a heavy object is
dropped down a tube in the top of the box, the platform is released
and anything resting on it is released from the box [see fig 1]. The
children were shown a small red token and informed that these
could be exchanged for stickers. The token was then placed onto
the platform and the children were shown a bowl of blue stones. If
the children did not spontaneously drop the stone down the tube,
they were encouraged to do so by the experimenter demonstrating
this action to them. Training was completed when the children
had dropped a stone into the apparatus, retrieved the token and
swapped it for a sticker twice.
The following experiments were conducted as near as possible
to the way that the corvids were tested so as to maintain the
possibility for direct comparisons between the studies. For this
reason, tasks were presented in a specific order which was not
counterbalanced between subjects. In all tasks, the children were
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informed that if they could retrieve the/one of the tokens they
could swap it for a sticker. To prevent them from reaching their
entire arm into the tube/tubes, the children were also told that
they were not allowed to put their thumb in the tube. To ensure
that the objects used were ‘‘novel’’ and that previous knowledge
about the specific properties could not affect performance and
reduce the need for task-specific learning, all objects used were
painted to disguise their material. The children were given 5 trials.
If they did not spontaneously insert any items they were prompted
with ‘‘You are allowed to try anything you like’’ or ‘‘why not just
try things’’ or ‘‘try to get the/one of the tokens’’. Approximately 7
items were needed to retrieve the token, although this varied
depending on children’s token-retrieval technique. Trials were
ended after two minutes or if the children inserted all available
Table 1. Predicted performance of children of different age groups.
Age Learning Ability
Type of rule that can
be learned Predicted performance
(as predicted by
literature)
Task 1 Water/
Sawdust
Task 2 Sinking/
Floating
Task 3 U-
tube
Able to adjust
expectations from
statistical regularities,
but unable to act on
this information
8 months
–4 years
Babies as young as 8
months are surprised when
statistical regularities are
violated, but are not
capable of acting on this
information.[10,11,12]
Normally, when I see X,
then I see Y.
7 7 7
Able to use
covariation to infer
causal relationships
4–6 4 Year-Olds able to infer
causal relationships using
Covariation and Contiguity
and act upon them.
[5,6,7,8,9,12] (but examples
used were easier cause-
effect relations that those
presented here)
If I do X, then Y happens. 3 3 3
Able to infer
underlying
mechanism
7–9 7–9 Year-Olds able to
come up with intuitive
novels solutions and
reason in terms of
mechanisms. [14,16,17,18]
If I do X, then Y happens,
because…
3 3 7
Able to flexibly
understand
underlying mechanism
10 Normally if I do X, then Y
happens, but not when
Z because
3 3 3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.t001
Figure 1. Schematic of the apparatuses used. 1a. Training Apparatus. When a stone is dropped into the tube, the platform drops and the
token is released. 1b. Tokens. When a token is retrieved, it can be swapped for a sticker of the child’s choice. 1c. Task 1: Water versus Sawdust. When a
marble is dropped into the water, the level of the floating token rises. When a stone is dropped into the sawdust, the level of the token does not
change. 1d. Task 2: Sinking versus Floating. When a marble is dropped into the water, it sinks and the level of the floating token rises. When a cork
ball is dropped into the water it floats and the level of the token does not change. 1e. Task 3: U-tube. When a stone is dropped into the U-tube, the
level of the floating token rises. When a stone is dropped into the separate tube, the level of the token does not change.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.g001
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items. If children had an error-free performance, including
successfully retrieving the token, on three consecutive trials they
were deemed to fully understand the task and were not tested
further (so as to prevent them from losing interest). Number and
location of item insertions were recorded, as well as success in
retrieving the token. Number of item insertions was used as the
dependant variable, token retrieval is reported in Supporting
Information S1.
Task 1: Water versus Sawdust
The children were presented with two Perspex tubes (inner
diameter 5 cm, outer diameter 6 cm, height 18 cm), one that
contained water and the other containing sawdust. A token was
placed into both tubes such that it rested on the surface of the
water/sawdust and was approximately 2 cm from the children’s
reach. Between the tubes was placed a bowl containing ten red
marbles of 2 cm diameter. Between trials, the positions of the two
tubes were exchanged pseudo-randomly.
Task 2: Sinking versus Floating
The procedure was identical to Task 1 except that a single
water-filled tube (inner diameter 5cm, outer diameter 6cm, height
18 cm) was presented beside a bowl containing 10 yellow cork
balls (1.5g) and 10 yellow marbles (15g). These were visually
indistinguishable in size (2cm diameter) and colour (yellow), but
differed in density and weight.
Task 3: U-tube
The children were presented with an apparatus consisting of
one U-shaped tube with one wide arm (3 cm inner diameter) and
one narrow arm (1.3 cm inner diameter), and a single wide tube
(3 cm inner diameter). These were embedded in an opaque base
such that the join of the U-tube was hidden and the apparatus
appeared to consist of two identical wide tubes with a narrow tube
between them (as shown in Fig. 1). Both tubes were filled with
water such that the level was equal between them and at least 1cm
from the aperture of the narrow arm of the U-tube. The base of
each wide tube was marked with a different coloured shape.
The children were presented with ten blue stones. These could
be inserted into the wide arm of the U-tube or the single wide
tube, but were too large to fit into the narrow arm of the U-tube. A
token was placed into the narrow tube (i.e. the narrow arm of the
U-tube). After the final trial, the children were asked ‘‘how do you
think this works?’’ Children’s answers were coded into four
categories: ‘‘No Explanation’’ consisted of silence, ‘‘I don’t know’’
or irrelevant responses, ‘‘Descriptive Explanation’’ consisted of an
accurate description of the relationship between the children’s
actions and the movement of the token, ‘‘Inference Explanation’’
consisted of an inference about a hidden connection between two
of the tubes, and ‘‘Mechanistic Explanation’’ consisted of answers
mentioning that the water was displaced by the dropping of the
stone.
Piagetian Conservation Task
To relate the results of this experiment to classic tasks, children
were also tested on the Piagetian conservation of volume task (e.g.
[15]). Children were presented with a tall thin container and a
short wide container and witnessed water being poured from one
to the other. They were then asked whether the amount of water
was now the same, more or less than it had been. The order in
which these options were presented was counterbalanced between
children. This methodology was chosen over more common
methods to prevent possible confounds resulting from repeated
questions [20].
Analysis
Because the majority of the data to be analysed is in the form of
proportions (number of correct actions out of total actions)
statistical analysis was mostly nonparametric. Performance was
compared to chance using one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests.
The average age of different groups was compared using
independent samples t-tests. Performance was correlated with
other metrics using Kendall’s Tau. Performance across tasks was
modelled using Generalized Estimating Equations with a binomial
logistic response type and generalized Chi statistic. Post-hoc tests
were conducted using Mann-Whitney U and Wilcoxon tests with
Sˇida´k alpha correction for multiple comparisons.
Results
Task 1: Water versus Sawdust
All 80 children took part in this task. Eight children completed 3
consecutive error-free trials (in which they only inserted stones into
the tube containing water). Four of these children (one 7-year-old,
two 8-year-olds and one one 10-year-old: mean age 8.48) showed
mistake-free performance from the first trial. A further four
children (one 5-year-old, one 7-year-old, one 8-year-old and one
10-year old: mean age 8.41) showed perfect performance from the
second trial onwards. While these children were not tested for the
subsequent trials, their performance was extrapolated for the
purposes of analysis.
Overall, performance improved gradually with age and reached
a plateau at 8years (Fig. 2a). Children aged 4–7 years gradually
learned over 5 trials which was the correct tube in which to insert
marbles. The proportion of stones inserted into the correct tube
was compared to a chance level of 0.5 for each age group for each
trial using one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests (see figure 2 for
statistics). Due to sample size constraints, performance against
chance was not calculated for the 6-year-olds and the 9/10-year-
old groups were combined. 4-year-olds performed better than
chance on their 5th trial only. 5-year-olds performed better than
chance on their 4th and 5th trials. 7-year-olds performed better
than chance on their 3rd and 5th trials. By contrast, 8- and 9/10-
year-olds all performed better than chance on the 1st trial and all
subsequent trials.
Age correlated positively with the proportion of marbles
inserted into the correct tube on all trials (Kendall’s tau: trial 1:
R(61) = 0.302, p,0.005; trial 2: R(71) = 0.204, p,0.05; trial 3:
R(77) = 0.260, p,0.005; trial 4: R(78) = 0.182, p,0.05; trial 5:
R(76) = 0.244, p,0.01). There was a significant effect of age-group
on proportion of marbles dropped into water in the first trial
(Kruskal Wallis test: p,0.05) but not in any subsequent trials.
Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons (Mann-Whitney U test with Sˇida´k
correction) indicated no significant differences between any
specific age-groups. Taken together, these results suggest that by
the age of 8 years, children know that dropping a marble into
water will cause the level to rise while those aged between 4- and
7-years are able to learn this over the course of 5 trials.
Task 2: Sinking versus Floating
All 80 children took part in this task. Thirteen children (one 5-
year-old, two 7-year-olds, seven 8-year-olds and three 9-year-olds,
mean age 8.23) solved the task without mistakes (i.e. inserted only
sinkable items into the tube) on 3 consecutive trials, although none
of them did so from the first trial. While these children were not
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Figure 2. Performance of Children on Task 1. 2a. shows the median proportion of children of different age groups across the five trials of Task 1.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 2b shows the individual marble insertions of 3 children chosen at random from each age cohort. Each
column represents the order in which items were inserted within a single trial. Grey columns indicate trials not performed due to error-free
performance in the three previous trials. Stars represent trials in which that age group performed above chance according to one-sample wilcoxen (4-
year-olds: (1st: W= 1, n = 9, p.0.05; 2nd: W=36, n = 12, p.0.1; 3rd: W= 38, n = 12, p.0.1; 4th: W= 29, n = 10, p.0.1; 5th: W= 71, n = 13, p,0.05; 5-year-
olds: 1st: W= 12, n = 8, p =.0.05, 2nd: W= 7, n = 10, p.0.5, 3rd: W= 29, n = 12, p.0.1, 4th: W= 63, n = 14, p = 0.05; 5th: W=82, n = 15, p,0.05; 7-year-
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tested for the subsequent trials, their performance was extrapo-
lated for the purposes of analysis.
As in the first task, performance improved gradually with age,
although it seemed to drop in the oldest children (Fig. 3a). The
proportion of stones inserted into the correct tube was compared
to a chance level of 0.5 for each age group for each trial using one-
sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests (exact statistics reported in
figure 3). Due to sample size constraints, performance against
chance was not calculated for the 6-year-olds and the 9/10 year
old groups were combined. 4-year-olds did not perform above
chance in any trial, 5-year-olds performed above chance in the
2nd and 5th trials, 7-year-olds performed above chance in the 2nd
trial and all subsequent trials and 8- and 9-/10-year-olds
performed above chance in all trials.
Age correlated significantly with performance in all trials
(Kendall’s Tau: 1st: R(78) = 0.422, p,0.001; 2nd: R(77) = 0.458,
p,0.001; 3rd: R(78) = 0.344, p,0.001; 4th: R(77) = 0.416,
p,0.001; 5th: R(78) = 0.372, p,0.001). There was a significant
effect of age in all trials (Kruskal-Wallis tests: trial 1: p,0.001; trial
2: p,0.001; trial 3: p,0.001; trial 4: p,0.001; trial 5: p,0.001).
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference
between 4- and 8-year-olds on all trials (Mann-Whitney U test
with Sˇida´k correction, trial 1: p,0.001; trial 2: p,0.001; trial 3:
p,0.001; trial 4: p,0.001; trial 5: p,0.001) between 4- and 9-
year-olds on all trials (Mann-Whitney U test, Sˇida´k correction,
trial 1: p,0.003; trial 2: p,0.001; trial 3: p,0.001; trial 4:
p,0.001; trial 5: p,0.003), between 5-and 8-year-olds on trials 1,
3, 4 and 5 (Mann-Whitney U test with Sˇida´k correction, trial 1:
p,0.001; trial 3: p,0.001; trial 4: p,0.001; trial 5: p,0.003) and
between 5- and 9-year-olds on trials 2 and 4 (Mann-Whitney U
test with Sˇida´k correction, trial 2: p,0.001; trial 4: p,0.001).
Taken together these results suggest a similar developmental
trajectory to that found for the first task, namely that by the age of
8 years, children know that dropping a sinking, rather than a
floating, object into water will cause its level to rise. In common
with the first task, we also found that younger children, specifically
those aged between 5- and 7-years, are able to learn this over the
course of 5 trials. Unlike the first task, however, the 4-year-old
children appear unable to learn the sinking versus floating task
within 5 trials.
Task 3: U-tube
Some children took part in another experiment (not reported)
instead of the U-tube task, which is why sample size was reduced
to Sixty-four children for this task. Of these, four children solved
the task without mistakes (inserted no stones into the single tube)
on 3 consecutive trials. One child (age 9.37) performed mistake-
free from the first trial. Three children (one 5-year-old, one 8-year-
old and one 10-year-old: mean age 8.2) performed mistake-free
from the second trial. While these children were not tested for the
subsequent trials, their performance was extrapolated for the
purposes of analysis.
Performance on this task was similar to Tasks 1 and 2. Again,
performance improved with age and trials (Fig 4). The proportion
of stones inserted into the correct tube was compared to a chance
level of 0.5 for each age group for each trial using one-sample
Wilcoxen signed ranks tests (exact statistics reported in figure 4).
Due to sample size constraints, performance against chance was
not calculated for the 6-year-olds and the 9/10 year-old groups
were combined. Chance was also not calculated for the 4-year-olds
and the first trial of the 5-year-olds because the majority of scores
were exactly 0.5. Wilcoxon analyses discount ‘‘matching’’ pairs
from the dataset and thus the sample size was reduced to under 5.
The 5-year-olds did not perform above chance in any trial, the 7-
year-olds performed above chance in all trials except the 2nd and
4th, the 8-year olds performed above chance in all except the 2nd
trial and the 9-/10-year-olds performed above chance in all trials.
Age correlated with performance only in the 4th and 5th trials
(Kendall’s Tau: Trial 4: R(63) = 0.291, p,0.005; trial 5:
R(62) = 0.266, p,0.01). There was an effect of age on perfor-
mance in only the 4th trial (p,0.05). Post-hoc pairwise
comparisons revealed a significant difference between 4- and 8-
year-olds (Mann-Whitney U test with Sˇida´k correction: p,0.001)
and between 4- and 9-year-olds (Mann-Whitney U test with Sˇida´k
correction: p,0.001) on the 4th trial only.
In answer to the question ‘‘how do you think this works?’’, no
children offered ‘‘Mechanistic Explanations’’, 25 children offered
‘‘Inference Explanations’’, 16 children offered a ‘‘Descriptive
Explanation’’ and 19 children offered no explanation at all (see
Table 2 for examples). Children who offered descriptive explana-
tions were significantly older than children who offered no
explanation (independent samples t-tests t(33) = 3.528, p,0.001;
means 7.89 and 5.83 respectively; see Fig. 5). However, there was
no difference in the age of children who offered an inference
explanation and those who offered a descriptive explanation
(independent samples t-tests t(37) = 0.21, p.0.8; means 8.02 and
7.89 respectively). Obviously verbal and general cognitive
development will account for much of the difference between
individuals in their reports; children may be able to understand a
concept, but not verbally able to report it. Nonetheless, such verbal
reports are informative as to children’s thought processes.
The proportion of stones dropped into the correct tube (the U-
tube) by children who offered different types of explanation was
compared to a chance level of 0.5 using one-sample Wilcoxon
signed rank tests. Children who offered no explanation did not
perform above chance in any trials (1st: W = 20, n = 8, p.0.05;
3rd: 219, n = 10, p.0.1; 4th: W = 6, n = 9, p.0.05; 5th: W =27,
n = 10, p.0.5). Children who offered a descriptive explanation
performed above chance in all trials (1st: W = 28, n = 7, p,0.02;
2nd: W = 45, n = 9, p,0.01; 3rd: W = 58, n = 12, p,0.05; 4th:
W = 103, n = 14, p,0.002; 4th: W = 74, n = 15, p,0.05). Children
who offered an inference explanation performed above chance in
all trials (1st: W = 78, n = 12, p,0.005; 2nd: W = 77, n = 14,
p,0.02; 3rd: W = 231, n = 21, p,0.001; 4th: W = 231, n(/r) = 21,
p,0.001; 5th: W = 247, n = 22, p,0.0001). There was a significant
effect of level of explanation on performance in all 5 trials
(independent samples Kruskal-Wallis Test: trial 1; p,0.001, trial
2: p,0.05, trial 3: p,0.001, trial 4: p,0.001, trial 5: p,0.001).
Taken together, the data on performance on the U-tube task
suggests that, as in the previous experiments, children from 8 years
were able to learn within a single trial which tube they should drop
stone into to cause the token to rise, even when the mechanism
was hidden (and potentially ‘‘counter-intuitive’’). Younger children
struggled with the task, but 7-year-olds could learn over 5 trials.
The children’s ability to pass this task appears to depend not on
their capacity to infer the presence of a hidden U-tube, but on
olds: 1st: W= 28, n = 9, p.0.05; 2nd: W=11, n = 9, p.0.05, 3rd: W=41, n = 9, p,0.02; 4th: W= 59, n = 14, p.0.05; 5th: W=100, n = 14, p,0.001; 8-year-
olds: 1st: W= 52, n = 11, p,0.05; 2nd: W=45, n = 11, p,0.05; 3rd: W=66, n = 11, p,0.005; 4th: W= 52, n = 11, p,0.05; 5th: W=66, n = 11, p,0.005; 9/
10-year-olds: 1st: W= 75, n = 12, p,0.005; 2nd: W=45, n = 11, p,0.002; 3rd: W= 78, n = 12, p,0.005; 4th: W= 82, n = 13, p,0.005; 5th: W=78, n = 12,
p,0.005).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.g002
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Figure 3. Performance of Children on Task 2. 3a. shows the median performance of children of different age groups across the five trials of Task
2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 3b shows the individual items inserted by 3 children chosen at random from each age cohort. Each
column represents the order in which items were inserted within a single trial. Grey columns indicate trials not performed due to error-free
performance in the three previous trials. Stars represent trials in which that age group performed above chance according to one-sample wilcoxen (4-
year-olds: 1st: W=215, n = 9, p.0.05; 2nd: W=23, n = 6, p.0.05; 3rd: W= 7, n = 8, p.0.05; 4th: W=29, n = 9, p.0.05; 5th: W= 14, n = 9, p.0.05; 5-year-
olds: 1st: W=28, n = 5, p.0.05; 2nd: W= 32, n = 8, p = 0.05; 3rd: W= 37, n = 10, p.0.05; 4th: W= 6, n = 8, p.0.05; 5th: W=35, n = 9, p = 0.05; 7-year-
olds: 1st: W= 17, n = 8, p.0.05; 2nd: W=36, n = 9, p = 0.05; 3rd: W=49, n = 10, p,0.02; 4th: W= 62, n = 11, p,0.01; 5th: W= 64, n = 11, p,0.005; 8-year-
olds: 1st: W=55, n = 10, p,0.01; 2nd: W= 53, n = 10, p,0.01; 3rd: W= 45, n = 9, p,0.005; 4th: W= 55, n = 10, p,0.01; 5th: W= 55, n = 10, p,0.01. 9-/10-
year-olds: 1st: W=45, n = 9, p,0.005; 2nd: W= 66, n = 11, p,0.005; 3rd: W= 55, n = 10, p,0.01; 4th: W=66, n = 11, p,0.005; 5th: W= 60, n = 12, p,0.02).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.g003
Figure 4. Performance of Children on Task 3. 4a. shows the median performance of children of different age groups across the five trials of Task
3. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 4b shows the individual stone insertions of 3 children chosen at random from each age cohort. Each
column represents the order in which items were inserted within a single trial. Stars represent trials in which that age group performed above chance
according to one-sample wilcoxen (5-year-olds: 2nd: W=11, n = 10, p.0.5; 3rd: W= 27, n = 10, p.0.1; 4th: W= 7, n = 9, p.0.05; 5th: W=14, n = 10,
p.0.1; 7-year-olds: 1st: W=45, n = 9, p,0.05; 2nd: W= 37, n = 10, p.0.05; 3rd: W= 56, n = 11, p,0.02; 4th: W=38, n = 10, p.0.1; 5th: W= 91, n = 13,
p,0.002; 8-year-olds: 1st: W= 21, n = 6, p = 0.05; 2nd: W=43, n = 11, p.0.05; 3rd: W= 55, n = 10, p,0.01; 4th: W= 62, n = 11, p,0.01; 5th: W=55, n = 10,
p,0.01: 9/10-year-olds: 1st: W=36, n = 9, p,0.05; 2nd: W= 45, n = 9, p,0.005; 3rd: W=76, n = 12, p,0.005; 4th: W= 60, n = 12, p,0.02; 5th: W=78,
n = 12, p,0.005)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.g004
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their ability to notice and describe the causal relationship between
a particular action and the approach of the token.
Analysis across Tasks
Data from all children in all three tasks was entered into a
Generalised Estimating Equations model with a binary logistic
response. The model included age (in years) and level of
explanation as between subjects factors, and trial and task as
within subjects factors. The model also included the following
interactions: age 6 trial, age 6 task, explanation 6 age,
explanation 6 trial, explanation 6 task, trial 6 task. The
dependant variable was proportion of correct actions (i.e.
marbles/stones dropped into the correct tube, or correct item
dropped into the water tube) out of total actions performed (i.e.
total number of items dropped).
The model found a main effect of Age (in years)
(x2(6) = 120.752, p,0.001), task (x2(2) = 14.152, p,0.001), trial
(x2(4) = 25.269, p,0.001) and level of explanation (x2(2) = 13.061,
p,0.001). Children of different ages were also shown to improve
over trials at different rates (age 6 trial interaction:
x2(24) = 93.214, p,0.001) and offer different levels of explanation
(level of explanation6 age interaction (x2(8) = 48.136, p,0.001).
Children with different levels of explanation were shown to
improve over trials at different rates (explanation 6 trial
interaction: x2(8) = 28.669, p,0.001) and perform differently on
different tasks (level of explanation6 task interaction: x2(4) = 15.0,
p,0.01). However, children of different ages did not perform
differently on different tasks (no age 6 task interaction
(x2(12) = 13.932, p.0.3, see Fig. 6) and children did not to
improve over trials at different rates in different tasks (no trial6
task interaction: x2(8) = 8.644, p.0.3). Given that there was an
interaction between age and level of explanation, and between
both these factors and trial, it would have been ideal to investigate
the interaction between these three factors. However, there were
not sufficient degrees of freedom to split the data any further.
These effects were further explored with a series of post-hoc
investigations. Performance did not differ between the tasks. There
was no significant difference between performance on any of the
tasks (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests: task 1–2: p.0.2, task 1–3:
p,0.9, task 2–3: p.0.5). This remained the case even if only data
from children who did not infer the presence of the U-tube in Task
3 were included (Friedman ANOVA: p.0.3). Looking at the tasks
together, performance improved significantly over trials: perfor-
mance on trial 1 differed from performance on trials 4 and 5
(Mann Whitney U tests: p,0.001 and p,0.005 respectively) and
performance on trial 2 also differed from performance on trial 5
(Mann Whitney U test: p,0.005).
Figure 5. Number of children in each age group that offered
each level of explanation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.g005
Table 2. Examples of answers given to the question ‘‘How do you think it works?’’
Type of Explanation Age of Child Explanation Offered
No Explanation
Children do not describe any association
between action and outcome.
4-Years -
4-Years
‘‘Green and Purple’’ -
‘‘Dunno’’
Description Explanation
Children describe the relationship, but offer
no explanation.
5-Years
- 7-Years
- 7-Years
‘‘Green makes water go down. Purple makes water go up.’’
‘‘One tube makes it go higher, the other doesn’t, dunno why.’’
‘‘This one makes the middle rise, this one doesn’t do anything.’’
Inference Explanation
Children offer an explanation that involves
a connection between the tubes.
8-Years -
8-Years
‘‘The purple one has a connecting pipe – pushes it down, makes it rise. The green one
has no connecting pipe.’’
‘‘Purple works, not Green one. There’s water underneath – stops the pebbles, makes
water rise in the middle tube.’’
Answers were coded by two observers, who had an 89% concordance rate. Children who said nothing were not included, children who spoke but did not describe were
coded as ‘‘no explanation’’, children who described some connection between their action and the outcome, but offered no explanation were coded as ‘‘description
explanation’’ and those that mentioned connectivity or ‘‘pushing’’ were coded as ‘‘inference explanation’’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.t002
Figure 6. Pattern of performance of children of each age group
on each task. Error Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040574.g006
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Children’s overall performance improved with age, but there
was not an increase in learning over trials (as measured by the
difference in proportion of correct actions between trials 1 and 5)
with age. There was a strong positive correlation between age and
the proportion of correct actions (Kendell’s tau: R(41) = 0.750,
p,0.001) but no correlation between age and learning (Kendall’s
tau: R =20.068, p.0.4). These results suggest that while the main
effect of age was due to a relatively linear improvement in
performance, this was not the case with the learning effect. Given
the poor performance of the youngest children and the almost
perfect performance of the oldest children, this might suggest that
the younger children were less able to learn across the five trials,
while the older children did not need to because their performance
was good from the first trial.
The children who offered ‘‘Inference Explanations’’ scored
better overall than those that offered ‘‘No Explanations’’ (Mann
Whitney U test with Sˇida´k correction: p,0.001). No other
comparisons regarding the levels of explanation were significant.
Children who offered ‘‘Descriptive Explanations’’ improved over
trials to a different degree to children who offered no explanation
(Mann Whitney U with Sˇida´k correction: p,0.017) Children’s
level of explanation had an impact on scores only in tasks 2 and 3
(Mann Whitney U test with Sˇida´k correction; p,0.001 and
p,0.001 respectively). This pattern of results suggests that while
performance on Task 1 did not depend on the ability to infer
unobservable events, or even describe causal relationships,
performance on Tasks 2 and 3 did relate to these factors.
Comparison with Piagetian Measure
There was no significant difference between children that did or
did not pass the conservation test in any of the tasks, although
there was a trend suggesting conservers performed better than
non-conservers on the U-tube task (task 1: t(63) = 0.709, p = 0.481;
task 2: t(63) = 0.018, p = 0.985; task 3: t(52) =21.802, p = 0.077).
Discussion
Our data indicate that children have, by the age of 8 years,
developed a sophisticated understanding of the relationship
between sinking objects and the resulting change in the level of
liquid. These children performed above chance from the 1st trial
in all tasks. Children between 4 and 7 years were able to learn
within 5 trials to drop marbles into water, rather than sawdust, to
raise its level, and children between 5 and 7 years were able to
learn within 5 trials to drop sinking, rather than floating, items into
water to raise its level. There was a suggestion that the younger
children (ages 4–5-years) learned more slowly than older children
(7-years), while children of 8-years and older were able to learn
within the first trial. This may suggest that instrumental
conditioning ability improves gradually across these age groups,
and is, by 8-years, an extremely fast and effective learning
mechanism. There was no significant difference between perfor-
mance on these tasks and performance on a task designed to
present ‘‘confusing’’ physical cues. This was the same across all age
groups (as indicated by the lack of age6 task interaction) and was
not the result of children inferring the presence of the U-tube. This
is counter to the hypotheses outlined in the introduction, which
predicted that children of between 7 and 9 years would have a
rudimentary understanding of the mechanisms underlying raising
the water level, and therefore be less able to perform on tasks in
which dropping a stone into one body of water apparently causes
the level of an adjacent body of water to rise (Task 3). It should be
noted at this point that the tasks were conducted in a fixed order
by all subjects to maintain comparability with the corvids. The
extent to which the experience of tasks 1 and 2 helped, hindered,
or was necessary for performance in task 3 was thus not
investigated, although this would make an interesting topic of
future study.
The performance of children on the first two tasks is
comparable to that of the three corvid species studied. Rooks,
Eurasian Jays and New Caledonian Crows were all able to learn to
drop stones into water rather than sawdust within about 5 trials, a
performance that equates roughly with the 4–7-year-old children
tested here. Eurasian Jays and New Caledonian Crows were able
to learn to drop sinking items into water rather than floating items
within 5 trials, a performance that equates roughly with the 5–7
year-old children.
Such comparisons are useful only to the extent to which we are
able to investigate the possible presence of some common
mechanism by which the children and corvids may be solving
such tasks. As such, an interesting difference between the
performance of the corvids and the children emerges in Task 3
(The U-tube Task). The Eurasian Jays tested performed substan-
tially worse on Task 3 than on Tasks 1 and 2. This was taken by
Cheke and colleagues [2] to suggest that the birds had a
rudimentary concept of the causal mechanism underlying the
relationship between their stone dropping and the movement of
the reward, and the causal relationship in the U-tube task violated
the assumptions of what was possible according to this mechanism.
The children’s performance was equivalent on this task to the
other tasks, even in those individuals that did not infer the
presence of the U-tube. The children who were successful on the
U-tube task were those that were able to notice and describe the
causal relationships between putting a stone in a particular place
and the approach of the food. These children could be said to be
learning using a model of instrumental learning suggested by
Cheke and colleagues in the Eurasian Jay paper [2]: Model D: Do
the action that causes the movement of the reward. In contrast, the
Jays’ performance was more in line with Model E: Do the action
that causes the movement of the reward, where the choice of
action is affected by, but not reliant on, some concept of
mechanism.
The fact that children were not impaired on the U-tube task
relative to the other tasks may indicate that the they did not
interpret the event as ‘‘impossible’’ because they did not
understand that insertion of an item into one body of water
cannot raise the level of another body of water. More likely, the
children simply ignored the ‘‘impossible’’ causal cues. Indeed, it
has been found that children as old as 11-year-old prioritise
contingency and contiguity as evidence of causality above
information about mechanism and may ignore information about
mechanism altogether if this conflicts with apparent contingency
information [13,21,22]. When applied to the current results this
finding might suggest that, due to the robust covariation, children’s
willingness to believe their actions to be causal was not impacted
by the presence of cues indicating that the token was not in the
same body of water as the stones. On the other hand, it may be
that children with no comprehension of the mechanism did not
explicitly attribute causation, but simply allowed covaration
information to guide their actions.
That a bias to prioritise co-variation above mechanism
information exists in children is extremely interesting and worthy
of further investigation. It may be that it is a useful developmental
stage which exists to allow children to learn about causation
unfettered by ideas of what is and is not ‘‘possible’’. On the other
hand, such a bias could conceivably come about as a product of
extensive technological enculturation: children have considerable
experience of devices with hidden mechanisms that make
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apparently impossible events happen (e.g. computers, light
switches) and for which children are not encouraged to investigate
mechanism (indeed, many adults do not understand anything
about the mechanism) but simply learn to use relying on
covariation between action and outcome. It may be that, for
children growing up in heavily mechanised/electrically powered
societies, understanding causal mechanisms has become somewhat
separated from the development of causal judgements. To
separate these two points, it might be interesting to study children
and adults from both mechanised and non-mechanised cultures to
discover in which populations this bias exists.
With regard to the present study, it should be noted that
children needed considerable probing on the U-tube task to
persuade them to do anything other than attempt to insert the
stones into the tube containing the token and in some cases might
never have done so without being explicitly told to ‘‘try the other
tubes’’. This was done because we were interested in their
learning, not their ability to disengage from a target. However, it
may be that this encouragement caused the children to think that
‘‘something would happen to the token’’ if they dropped a stone
into one of the other tubes, and therefore to look between them to
check. There is evidence that young children will ignore the
evidence of their own eyes if given conflicting testimony by an
adult [23]. This idea that dropping a stone into an apparently
unconnected body of water might alter the position of the target
might have been exactly what was missing in the birds – they may
simply not have looked in the correct place to see the result of their
actions. Furthermore the school setting and that the task was
presented by an adult may have led the children to trust that there
must be a solution, and to accept that they may not understand it;
this is after all a common occurrence in the classroom.
In general the comparison between the performance of the
corvids and children should be undertaken with extreme caution.
One cannot easily compare the results from a few individuals (as
with the birds) to a large cohort (as with the children). Furthermore
time constraints meant that the children had only 5 trials at each
task and undertook all three tasks in the space of an hour, while
the birds had 15 trials and undertook the tasks over several days. It
may be that the differences between the tasks similar to the birds
might emerge in children if given more trials, or a longer break
between tasks. The size and morphological differences between the
birds and children should also be noted; having two hands meant
that the children had access to different advantageous (e.g. pushing
down on floating items to force them under the water) and
disadvantageous (inserting two stones simultaneously into both
tubes in Task 3 such that it was impossible to know which raised
the token) strategies, which will have had a considerable impact on
their learning. Furthermore, a bird’s beak is very much closer to its
eyes than a child’s hands are to theirs. This difference has a
substantial impact on what cues these groups can observe while
conducting the task. Finally, while the corvids were working for
primary reinforcers, the children were working for tokens which
could be swapped, which may have led to differences in
motivation. Nonetheless, despite these caveats, we believe that
there is much to be learned from performing comparable tests in
different species.
It is interesting to note that children only started reliably
performing above chance on any of the tasks by the age of 8. This
is in line with recent findings that children only reliably perform
‘‘intuitive’’ problem solving using tools at around 7–8 years
[17,18], and with the age at which children tend to pass the
Piagetian volume conservation task [15]. However there are two
surprising elements. First, that this task, which does not require
such ‘‘insightful’’ re-evaluation of a situation but instead uses a
pre-trained motor action and gives clear co-variation cues, should
be passed so late. Specifically, much later than the False Belief
Task (which is passed at around 4-years), which involves reasoning
about complex unobservable causal mechanisms (i.e. beliefs). This
apparently paradoxical developmental asynchrony may be the
result of the differential attention and weight given to social and
physical information: consider the finding of Whiten and
colleagues [24,25] that young children (and indeed adults [26])
will imitate the actions of a demonstrator even when they are
obviously causally irrelevant. Children are constantly encouraged
to consider human behaviour in terms of the underlying
mechanism (e.g. emotions, beliefs) but are rarely encouraged to
do so in the same way with machines. It is furthermore surprising
that there was little to no relationship between performance on
these experiments and on the conservation task. However, this
could be interpreted as further evidence that children solved the
tasks using covariation cues alone, rather than drawing on their
knowledge of the nature of the underlying mechanism.
In summary, children between 4 and 10 years of age were tested
on a tool-use task developed with corvids [1,2,3]. Although
children from 4-years were able to learn to drop marbles into
water rather than sawdust to raise the level of a token over the
course of 5 trials, this task was only solved reliably by children over
8 years of age. Children from 5-years were able to learn to drop
marbles, rather than cork balls, into water to raise the level of a
token over the course of 5 trials. Again this task was only solved
reliably by children over 8-years of age. Finally, children did not
perform relatively worse on a task in which dropping a stone into
one tube of water apparently caused a rise in level of the token
floating in an adjacent tube of water. This result is in contrast to
the corvid findings and may support previous research that
children will ignore information regarding mechanism in favour of
using co-variation as evidence of causation, or to guide their
actions when causation is uncertain.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 Token Retrieval. The success in
retrieving the token was recorded. The purpose of the study was to
report on the learning process and on whether children learned to
perform and repeat the effective action over the ineffective action.
The number of effective actions performed was thus the variable
studied. The success at retrieving the token is a far messier
measure since it depends on so many other factors (children’s
token-extraction technique, children’s motivation). Given the
number of analyses already in the study, it was decided not to
conduct in-depth analyses into token-retrieval.
(DOC)
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